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Greece’s failed economy is attracting the attention of a great range of 
economists. Some prominent economists adopt the reductionist theory that 
the rewards sought from a nation’s economy boil down to employment -- 
and employment is determined by “demand.” They say that a fiscal shift to 
a newfound “austerity” has decreased demand and thus depressed 
employment. But the evidence does not verify that austerity is the main 
cause. We must not be obsessed by a monistic theory of everything. A 
fuller understanding requires more than one model. It would be useful if 
economists would draw on the modern idea that a person’s rewards from 
work in the nation’s economy derive, directly or indirectly, from 
entrepreneurial and innovative activity. Greece’s problem is that it is 





What Ails Greece? Two Economic Perspectives 
 
by Edmund Phelps* 
  
The recent clashes of opinion on Greece’s much-discussed ordeal highlight 
some fault lines in present-day economics. The discussion reveals differing 
perspectives on what people want from their economies. From one perspective, 
every economy is a mechanical instrument. In Greece, it has been used to 
provide jobs, social benefits and public investments. Now, as some economists 
see it, financial burdens prompting fiscal “austerity” have thrown a monkey 
wrench into the machine, causing a drop in “demand,” hence a drop in jobs, 
benefits and capital projects. The mechanists would fix Greece’s economy by 
restoring demand. 
 
But an economy can be an organism that people – exploring, 
experimenting, imagining and creating – cultivate in efforts to develop new 
goods and gain new experience in the process. What economists taking this 
view perceive in Greece, though, is a host of barriers to competition, 
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entrepreneurship, start-ups and change that block new goods and experience. 
The structuralists would unlock Greece’s potential by removing barriers. 
 
Yet the mechanists offer precious little evidence for their austerity thesis on 
Greece and the structuralists have not shown even circumstantial evidence that 
entrepreneurship and innovation are blocked in Greece. This paper reviews the 
two theses and tests them against evidence.  
 
I 
Overlooking the modern idea that a nation’s prosperity derives from innovation 
and entrepreneurship, the mechanists view prosperity as a matter of output and 
employment, which are largely determined in turn by “demand” – government 
spending, consumer demand and investment demand, all of which need to be 
financed. 
 
Regarding Greece, this demand school says that a shift of fiscal policy to 
“austerity” – a small public sector – has brought a deficiency of demand, which 
depressed employment. But this claim misreads history and exaggerates the 




Much of the decline of employment occurred prior to the sharp cuts in 
spending between 2012 and 2014 – owing, no doubt, to sinking confidence in 
the economy before the cuts. The evidence: 
▪Greek government expenditure per quarter climbed to a plateau of around 13.5 
billion in 2009-2012, then fell back over 2013 to around 9.6 in 2014-2015. Yet 
employment had been at a high of 4.5 million in 2006-2009, then fell over 
2010 and 2011 to 3.6 in 2012 to the present. 1  
 
Evidence on unemployment reinforces that finding. The unemployment rate 
had almost risen to its recent level of around 25.5 when the budget cuts were 
just beginning. 
▪From a normal level of 9.6 percent in 2009, the unemployment rate rose to 
12.7 in 2010, to 17.9 in 2011 and to nearly 24.5 in 2012. 
 
These findings weigh heavily against the hypothesis that “fiscal austerity” 
has brought Greece to its present plight. They indicate that Greece’s turn away 
from the high spending of 2008 to 2013 is not to blame for today’s mass 
unemployment. Evidently the demand school has wildly overestimated the role 
played by fiscal policy. 
 
                                                 
1
  Eurostat, General government expenditure, annual data, extracted 27 July 2015, and 
Trading Economics, quarterly data, extracted 27 July 2015. General government expenditure 
in percent of GDP was around 54 in the period 2009-2012 and, after a brief rise, nosedived to 
49.3 in 2014. 
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Another finding puts in doubt the very presence of fiscal austerity. 
Government spending has certainly fallen, but only back to its accustomed 
neighborhood. 
▪After its fall, rise, and fall, government expenditure – at 9.6 billion euros in 
first quarter 2015 – still exceeds its level of 2003 and earlier. 2 
 
It might be wondered whether the observation that government expenditure 
fell back to its pre-boom neighborhood, not to new depths, misses the 
possibility that productivity strongly rose over this span and that could have 
been positive for output and negative for employment, so that government 
expenditures would have had to rise strongly too just to keep employment from 
falling. However, it does not appear that government expenditures have shrunk 
relative to the gross domestic product. 
                                                 
2  
Archival data from Eurostat available at tradingeconomics.com A chart shows the below-
average spending, 2001-2008, and the above-average spending, 2010-2014. 
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▪After its fall, rise and fall, this spending – at 49.3 percent of GDP in 2014 – is 
back to its level in 1997-2000. The mean level in 1995-2014 is 49.44 percent.
3
 
So the austerity thesis appears wrong in its very premise. 
 
It could be argued that the fiscal deficit and public debt are better measures 
of stimulus than the level of public expenditure is. But the austerity thesis fares 
no better on these measures. 
▪The deficit was 10.2 percent of GDP in 2011 and hit 12.3 percent in 2013. 
▪Public debt reached 175 percent in 2013. 
 
So there is much evidence that Greece has not departed from past fiscal 
norms: it has only returned to them after the splurges of earlier years. It is 
unhistorical to speak of present-day government spending as “austere.” It 
would be more fitting to view Greece as having moved away from wayward 
years of fiscal profligacy. Though it still has some distance to go: even now, 




The demand school might reply to all this that their basic contention – 
whether or not fiscal austerity is present – is that increased government 
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Archival data from Eurostat available at tradingeconomics.com A chart shows the below-
average spending, 2001-2008, and the above-average spending, 2010-2014. 
4
  Eurostat, General government gross debt. Date of extraction 24 July 2015. 
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spending, financed by fiscal deficits, would impart a permanent lift to 
employment. However, the recent experience in Greece suggests otherwise:  
▪Following the huge rise in government spending from 2006 to 2009-2013, 




But the real sticking point is that Greeks would have to save the extra 
income from the increase in government spending to buy the government’s 
bond issues financing the extra spending – supposing there was a limit to the 
bonds foreigners would buy. And in an economy unequipped for growth, 
household wealth relative to wages would soar and the labor supply would 
shrink, contracting employment.  
 
So spending more is not the remedy for Greece’s plight, just as spending 
less was not the cause. As the Italian economist Luigi Bonatti said in a recent 
letter, to claim that one can address Greece’s structural stagnation with 
Keynesian policies is ridiculous! 
 
Similarly, debt restructuring, even debt forgiveness, would not suffice to 
regain the elevated levels of employment, social services and capital projects 
                                                 
5
  Eurostat, General government expenditure, annual data, and Trading Economics. A roughly 
one billion euro jump of government spending per quarter – the rise of quarterly government 
spending from around 11.8 billion euros in the first half of 2006 to around 12.9 billion in 
2009 – was followed by a rise of employment 4.52 million in 2006 to a peak of 4.61 million 
in 2008. The unemployment rate fell from around 9.0 percent in 2006 to a low-water mark of 
around 8 percent in 2008 and was back to 9.6 percent in 2009.) 
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that resulted from the European Union’s gift of structural funds from 2007 to 
2010. And it would fail dramatically to unlock Greece’s potential for 
innovation – for discovering new goods and gaining the experience of personal 
achievement and personal growth. It would only help Greece revive its 
government spending level. 
 
It is time that economists begin to consider the structuralist perspective on 
the potential of an economy and how it has been blocked. 
 
II 
From the structuralist perspective, Greece’s public sector is rife with 
clientelism to gain votes and cronyism to gain favors – far more so than in most 
of Europe. 




 ▪The government favors business elites with tax free status. 
▪Some state employees are found not to have to report for work. 
 
From this same perspective, there are serious ills in the private sector, too, 
notably the pervasive influence of vested interests and the country’s business 
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  International Social Security Association, ISSA, Social Security Country Profiles. 
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and political elites. Competition between companies for increased market share 
is weak and firms with new ideas bearing new ideas are few. Evidence: 
▪Profits as a share of business income were a whopping 46 percent according 
to the last reported data. Italy came in second at 42 percent and France third at 
41 percent. (Germany was at 39, the US at 35 and the UK at 32.)
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▪Insiders receive subsidies and contracts, making it all the more difficult for 
outsiders to start up competing companies. 
▪Young Greek entrepreneurs reportedly fear to incorporate their firms in 
Greece lest others use false documents to take away their companies.
8
 
▪The World Bank rates starting a business in Greece to be harder than 




This stunted system springs from Greece’s corporatist values: social 
protection, solidarity instead of competition, and discomfort with uncontrolled 
change. These values may well be beneficial for family life, but, even with the 
best of intentions, they are a recipe for a static economy and stultified careers. 
 
Greece’s system performs far below the others in the European Union – the 
earliest 15 members at any rate. 
                                                 
7
  OECD Economic Outlook December 1998, Annex Table 24, p. 214. 1997 is the final year. 
8
  This hole in Greece’s property rights is reported by Peter Jungen, who learned of it in talking 
with young Greek entrepreneurs at a meeting on the island of Hydra. 
9
  World Bank, Doing Business. 
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▪Labor productivity – GDP per worker – in Greece is around 72 percent of that 
in Britain and Italy; and 57.7 per cent of that in Germany and Ireland.
10
 
▪Surveys report that mean life satisfaction in Greece is far below the EU15. 
 
And while Greek governments suggest their corporatism serves the less 
advantaged, in fact it impoverishes them. 
▪EU data on poverty rates in 2010 put Greece at 21.4 per cent – far higher than 




Greece’s system blocks the two main sources of broad prosperity. One is an 
abundance of entrepreneurs engaged in detecting and exploiting new economic 
opportunities – Hayek spoke of adaptations to “changing circumstances.” On 
adaptation, Greece looks very poor.  
▪Productivity and wage gains since the postwar catch-up have resulted mostly 




▪Greece’s much-lauded shipowners, for example, were too slow to adapt to 
containerization and thus lost market share. 
 
                                                 
10
  Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2015 © OECD 2015 
11  Eurostat, EU-SILC. Poverty rates in EU countries. 2011 (based on 2010 incomes). 
12   The World Bank, Golden Growth, 2012, Washington D.C., p. 40. In the standard analysis, 
wage growth may be decomposed into capital deepening, human capital deepening and 
growth of “total factor productivity.” 
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The other source is plenty of business people engaged in conceiving and 
creating all sorts of new products and processes – often termed indigenous 
innovation. On innovation, Greece looks devoid of the necessary dynamism. 
▪Venture capital investment flows relative to GDP are smaller in Greece than 




So Greece’s economy has scant ability to create sustained productivity 
growth and high human satisfaction. On top of that, Greece, like all Europe, 
has felt the productivity slowdown in America and its financial crisis. 
 
Some mechanist economists believe that these structural considerations 
have nothing to do with Greece’s current crisis – only with long-term 
performance. Of course, the Greek economy is now dying of a thousand cuts. 
The structuralist perspective illuminates what went wrong – and why. 
 
For several years, Greece drew on the EU’s aptly named “structural funds” 
and on loans from German and French banks to finance a wide swath of highly 
labor-intensive projects. Employment and incomes soared and savings piled 
up. When that capital inflow stopped, asset prices in Greece fell back and 
demand for labor in the capital-goods sector dropped correspondingly. 
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  Going for Growth, OECD, Paris, 2006. 
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Moreover, with household wealth having far outstripped wage rates, the supply 
of labor diminished as well.
14
 Thus, Greece went from boom to outright slump. 
 
The structuralist perspective also explains why recovery has been slow. 
With competition weak, entrepreneurs did not rush to hire the unemployed. 
When recovery began, political unrest last fall nipped confidence in the bud. 
 
What is to be done, then? The Eurozone creditors can best help Greece by 
inducing it to rid itself of its corporatist practices in the public and private 
sectors. The remedy must lie in adopting the right structural reforms.  
 
Such a hope may seem unrealistic. A cynic might think that the latent 
purpose of the reforms sought by the Eurozone members to date was to raise 
the chances of repayment of their past loans. However, the members also have 
a political and economic interest in doing what is best for the development and 
survival of the monetary union. So they could help strengthen the union by 
working with Greece to rid it of its corporatist ways. They should also be ready 
to help Greece with the costs of making the changes. 
 
                                                 
14
  Greece’s wealth-to-median-income ratio belongs in the high group, with Italy, Spain and 
Belgium, not the low group containing Germany, Austria and Holland. European Central 
Bank, The Eurosystem Household Finance Survey, Statistics Paper Series No. 2, April 2013. 
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Greece, though, must drive reform. Current indications are that Prime 
Minister Alexis Tsipras is willing to take that course. As a media expert, 
George Pleios, was quoted as saying, “he is showing that he is able to speak 
the language of reform.” 15 However, he will need a sense of the reforms 
required. Greece must understand that the task is not simply to dismantle 
corporatist institutions and practices that obstruct whatever innovativeness and 
entrepreneurship could arise. For an abundance of imaginative innovators and 
vibrant entrepreneurs, Greece must embrace a vision of venturesome lives of 
discovery and creativity – the prospering that comes only from human agency, 
from individual successes, and the flourishing that comes only with the 
experience and self-expression found in imagining and creating the new. 
 
So Greece needs more than just debt restructuring or even debt relief. If 
young Greeks are to have a future in their own country, Greece needs to 
develop the attitudes and institutions that constitute an inclusive modern 
economy. 
 
Europe for its part must think beyond the reforms (necessary though they 
are) of Greece’s systems of pensions, taxation, and collective bargaining. It 
must examine Greece’s values and its own, too. While Greece has reached the 
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  Suzanne Daley, “Alexis Tsipras, Greek Prime Minister, Sheds His Identity as a Radical,” New 
York Times, 21 July 2015. 
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heights of corporatism, Italy and France are not far behind – and not far behind 
them is Germany. Not just Greece but all of Europe must rethink its economic 
philosophy. 
 
